Barnaby Heddington considers the human rights abuses facing the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, China, the impact of Covid-19 on the situation and how China’s economic power has influenced the approach of foreign governments towards the issue.
In mid-March, several news outlets warned that the far-western Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang was in ‘danger of [a] severe Covid-19 outbreak’, due to the conditions in the region’s notorious Uyghur internment camps.[1] This threat never came to pass; according to government figures, only 76 Covid-19 cases were recorded, and no new cases have been reported since 8 March.[2]
However, China has seized upon the opportunity to clamp down further on human rights in Xinjiang during the past six months, and a global response to China’s treatment of the Uyghur minority ethnic group looks further away than ever. That said, even before the onset of the global pandemic in January 2020, many countries’ interest in maintaining beneficial economic and diplomatic relationships with China eclipsed their ability to raise concerns about the situation in Xinjiang.
A pre-existing human rights issue
China’s human rights record in Xinjiang is widely considered to be one of the worst in the world. Muslim minority groups, the largest of which is the Uyghurs, have suffered from a severe curtailment of freedom since the beginning of China’s ‘re-education campaign’. The Washington Post has estimated that over one million people are detained in internment camps;[3] former detainees’ testimonies and satellite imagery provide evidence of this scale. Inside the camps, community activities like the forced learning of Mandarin, pledging loyalty to the Communist Party of China, and renouncing Islam occur.[4] Torture, sleep deprivation during interrogations, sexual abuse, and forced abortions have all been reported.[5]
In November 2019 the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) released the ‘China cables’, revealing the operations manual for running the camps and the methods of mass surveillance in Xinjiang. The 2017 document, approved by Zhu Hailun – the region’s then top security official, included directions for how to keep the camps’ existence secret, methods of forced indoctrination, when to let detainees see relatives and even use the toilet.[6] Manual searches, facial recognition cameras, phone data, and Uyghurs’ movements abroad are all used to maintain total surveillance over the population.[7] Overall, the documents confirm the largest mass incarceration of an ethnic-religious minority since World War II.
In addition, the leaking of the ‘Karakax list’ in February 2020 – during the Covid-19 crisis, thereby avoiding the international publicity it might otherwise have gained, was a further important development. Created between 2017 and 2019, the list recorded the reasons for the detention of more than 300 Uyghurs in a single Xinjiang county.[8] Families in the 137-page database were classified as either ‘trustworthy’ or ‘not trustworthy’, their religiosity either ‘light’ or ‘heavy’. Individuals were interned for periods of one year or longer for reasons including ‘minor religious infection’, having ‘relatives abroad’, ‘thinking is hard to grasp’, ‘untrustworthy person born in a certain decade’ and ‘disturb[ing] other persons by visiting them without reasons’.[9]
Most concerningly, religious activities including praying, attending the mosque and even growing a long beard would lead to ‘religious infection’ in the authorities’ eyes.[10] Thus the Chinese state’s assault on religion in Xinjiang is as pronounced in other provinces, where religious freedoms for Hui Muslims and Christians have been increasingly curtailed.[11] Also clear from the ‘Karakax list’ is that the detention of one person made the rest of the family members automatically more suspicious. Other activities such as breaking family planning laws, getting a passport, going abroad, and clicking on foreign websites were targeted by officials in the remote county occupying part of the Taklamakan Desert.[12] The ‘Karakax list’ therefore serves to expose the region-wide system of repression.
The objective is widely believed by experts to be to reform the culture, ideology and religious practices of Muslim minorities, whom the state views as harbouring ‘terrorist’ views.[13] To achieve this, it therefore appears that Islamic belief is being deterred, ethnic culture erased, and the Uyghurs’ primary loyalty re-focused towards the Chinese state. To take one example, independent experts confirmed that authorities had demolished over 100 Uyghur graveyards.[14] Some of these, such as the over 1,000-year-old Sultanim Cemetery in Hotan – turned into a car park, was a place of great spiritual significance for locals.
Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party’s own newspaper boasted in 2018 of 1.1 million civil servants being sent to Xinjiang to ‘pair up with ethnic minority residents to improve unity’.[15] Far from being an affectionate cultural exchange, however, the intrusion into the only remaining safe space for Uyghurs has not gone unnoticed by critics; secular lives are required even within the family home. The visiting ‘relatives’ as they are called, are trained to uncover religious and ethnic attitudes, and glean information from children in the families.[16] Personal testimonies from hundreds of Uyghurs also describe their experiences in the internment camps, and the extent of official involvement in their day-to-day lives.[17] The harrowing story of Tursunay Ziyawudun’s psychological torture in one of Xinjiang’s internment camps and subsequent harassment by authorities is seen by many to lay bare the brutality of the system.[18]
The impact of Covid-19
A full-scale lockdown in Xinjiang in mid-February after two cases of Covid-19 were discovered in the regional capital Urumqi had an immediate effect on locals’ freedom of movement, as in other parts of the world. But the Uyghur Human Rights Project reported that in Xinjiang people suffered from food and medicine shortages as a result of the harsh order to remain indoors.[19] The group posted two videos which appeared to show residents pleading officials for food, shouting that their families were starving.[20]
Elijan Anajit, spokesperson for the Information Office of the regional government, dismissed the reports by stating they were ‘misinformation’ and ‘fabrications’, without addressing the individual claims.[21] However, the videos were independently corroborated, and there were very real enforcement orders. In the city of Atush for example, residents who left their home without permission found themselves liable to being detained for 15 days in an internment camp.[22] Some Atush residents told reporters they were not given enough time to buy food before a state of emergency was declared in the city. Residents from Wuhan were also quarantined in the city.[23]
However, Uyghurs outside of China fear the Covid-19 numbers may not be accurate, and due to censorship laws, the sheer dearth of information about conditions in the already poorly sanitised camps makes it virtually impossible to gain a true picture. Diets are poor and rough treatment in the camps is common. When reporters asked local officials and health workers about the outbreak in Xinjiang in February 2020, they were met with stone wall silence, being told by one official that information concerning Covid-19 in Xinjiang was a ‘state secret’.[24]
It is worth mentioning that this lack of governmental transparency was itself blamed for the extent of the outbreak in Wuhan itself. Indeed, the argument by some in the global community, that China violated Articles 6 and 7 of the International Health Regulations (IHR) regarding reporting of disease outbreaks [25], is certainly lent credence by its approach to Covid-19 in Xinjiang. Despite claims by Chinese media that all the Uyghurs were released in December 2019 after the initial outbreak in Wuhan, the authorities have failed to provide any evidence to support the assertion.
However, since the turn of the year increased reports of coerced labour of Muslim minority workers – many of whom were released from the camps, may provide the key to a change of focus by the authorities. Uyghur and Kazakh villagers since January 2020 have been pushed into jobs in newly established factories, and families were penalised for refusal.[26] Academic Darren Byler highlighted the ‘great deal of pressure placed on individuals to sign work contracts’ in these contexts.[27] Recent reports of forced labour occurring in multinational supply chains, due to Xinjiang’s heavy cotton production, have also raised concerns in the West.[28] Overall though, China’s apparent shift in Xinjiang towards forced labour rather than internment camps may signal a subtle attempt to mute foreign protestations – whilst maintaining all of the mechanisms of repression.
Soon into the epidemic, hundreds of Uyghurs were sent to other regions of China such as Hunan, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces to work in factories particularly affected by Covid-19.[29] Even Hubei province, the epicentre of the epidemic, received Uyghur labourers.[30] The assignments were reported by Chinese media itself, and since receiving Western media attention, no further updates have been provided. And within Xinjiang itself, more than 20,000 people from predominately Uyghur counties were sent to work in the region’s cities of Hotan, Kashgar and Urumqi by March 20, as reported by the state-run Xinjiang Daily.[31] It is alarming that Uyghurs appear to be used by the Chinese state as a form of cheap labour even in the time of Covid-19.
There are numerous other concerns too; many of which are intrinsically tied to the extent of China’s continued mass-surveillance undertaking which emerges out of the pandemic. For example, Axios reported that Chinese coronavirus test maker BGI has agreed to conduct the gene sequencing of Xinjiang residents, as well as committed to build a ‘judicial collaboration’ centre in the region.[32] This could lead to genetics-based surveillance, whereby individuals’ genetic records are used by authorities to predict and monitor their propensity to act in a manner which diverges from the state’s expectations. BGI and its subsidiaries have since July 2016 ‘contributed to efforts to document the genetic material of ethnic minorities, including the forensic applications’.[33] The company has long-standing ties to the Chinese government, including receiving funding and operating government facilities, and recent laws mandate all companies’ cooperation with the government.[34]
Economic diplomacy
Although some states have increasingly raised China’s repression of the Uyghurs at an international level, other countries’ responses to human rights abuses in Xinjiang have been largely muted. In January 2018, Human Rights Watch’s UK Director David Mepham called the UK’s response to China’s repression ‘weak and pusillanimous’ in comparison to Germany’s. This was likely down to the UK’s impending departure from the EU and its desire for beneficial trade deals with even the most repressive regimes.
However, by October 2019, 23 countries including the UK, US and France, condemned China’s record at the UN Committee on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs. Indeed, British UN Ambassador Karen Pierce delivered the group’s joint statement, which decried China’s ‘human rights violations and abuses’ which disproportionately target ethnic Uyghurs.[35]
Meanwhile, in July 2019, 37 countries had praised China’s ‘remarkable achievements in the field of human rights’; the grouping included Pakistan, Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Algeria, amongst other Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries.[36] Sophie Richardson, Human Rights Watch’s China director, stated that these countries’ support for China stems from the fact that “they need Chinese investment.”[37]
For example, Egypt’s eagerness for Chinese investment in infrastructure projects led to it allowing Chinese police to interrogate Uyghur exiles in Egypt itself.[38] Pakistan’s strategic and wide-ranging alliance with China enabled its leaders to essentially plead ignorance on the issue.[39] Even Turkey, a country which previously had drawn attention to the plight of the Uyghurs has recently adopted an uncritical tone. It did not sign the October 2019 statement for example, as Erdogan has found himself in recent need for Chinese support on issues such as the Syrian Civil War.[40] Hence, economic and diplomatic concerns overshadow Uyghurs’ human rights, for many governments.
In a similar vein, former US National Security Advisor John Bolton recently claimed (June 18) that Donald Trump explicitly endorsed the Chinese government’s repressive approach towards Muslim minorities in Xinjiang in order to gain favour with Xi Jinping.[41] Disputing the extent of his approval of the camps, Trump at least acknowledged that he held off tougher sanctions on China related to human rights in Xinjiang due to ongoing trade negotiations with Beijing.[42] Ultimately, Trump’s behaviour demonstrates where his sole interest lies when managing the US’s diplomatic relationship with China.
However, politicians in the US have been some of the most outspoken regarding Uyghur rights. Since October 2019, import restrictions on Chinese companies operating in Xinjiang and visa bans on officials linked to the region have been enforced. In late April 2020, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) recommended that the State Department classify China as a ‘Country of Particular Concern’ and impose sanctions for violating religious freedoms.[43] These are tangible steps which at least demonstrate recognition of China’s human rights violations in Xinjiang.
Most recently, on June 17, Trump signed a widely supported Congress bill to call for sanctions on China over its ‘gross human rights violations’ in Xinjiang.[44] The effect of this legislation is not yet clear, though its requirements are to be considered ‘advisory’ rather than ‘mandatory’ according to the Bill’s accompanying signing statement.[45] Most significantly, as the Bolton revelations indicated, Trump’s negotiations with China are clearly tied up in trade talks first and foremost. The US led by Trump appears to operate in a purely realpolitik manner. The future of Uyghurs’ rights in Xinjiang depends on China’s future direction as an authoritarian state, and its conflict with the West over the status of global superpower.
[1] https://asiatimes.com/2020/03/xinjiang-in-danger-of-severe-covid-19-outbreak/;
[2] https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202003/08/WS5e64a4d4a31012821727d330.html
[3] https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/a-spreadsheet-of-those-in-hell-how-china-corralled-uighurs-into-concentration-camps/2020/02/28/4daeca4a-58c8-11ea-ab68-101ecfec2532_story.html
[4] https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological-viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs
[5] https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/09/china-massive-crackdown-muslim-region
[6] https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/
[7] Ibid.
[8] https://www.jpolrisk.com/karakax/?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=516c3cdc269f929e022857d354c4e2eab6a24884-1593179376-0-AZBhwzCGpsWnXZUFKJ24MToR6Bc3L-lUuYthE12SaVpiEDXcQhX24G_zigbYpjsXAisY8rY3S1IcOaKPay0YEfLH43muStlqTWiQ_gZrG2y2BMptJzoG2cBb3KFnd1eKGowv8ZZ9a1TlqudUZ0qy-QRHLhIhrttzIbjg4BA14yF4d__jN3Ls2U6Zl-Qe-vQu29w-IUh_NWUl5MtHgR6YjrdLNkpYv2Wo2gDpI5bX5gx8aRP6WYkVqq4RhBXV2603ZAbzlEjKPMBbyVtTrFvNeqOiDLrOyh9EKjteDKnCyjGr
[9] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/18/china-detains-uighurs-for-growing-beards-or-visiting-foreign-websites-leak-reveals
[10] Ibid.
[11] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
[12] https://www.ft.com/content/e0224416-4e77-11ea-95a0-43d18ec715f5
[13] Finnegan, C., 2020. The Uyghur Minority in China: A Case Study of Cultural Genocide, Minority Rights and the Insufficiency of the International Legal Framework in Preventing State-Imposed Extinction. Laws, 9(1), p.8.
[14] https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/02/asia/xinjiang-uyghur-graveyards-china-intl-hnk/index.html
[15] http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1126378.shtml
[16] https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/09/opinions/uyghur-home-visit-opinion-intl/index.html
[17] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/09/asia/xinjiang-china-kazakhstan-detention-intl/index.html
[18] https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/meghara/china-uighur-xinjiang-kazakhstan
[19] https://hongkongfp.com/2020/02/27/uighur-activists-say-chinas-coronavirus-measures-causing-widespread-hunger/
[20] https://uhrp.org/press-release/uhrp-briefing-local-residents-danger-starving-east-turkistan.html
[21] http://www.ecns.cn/news/politics/2020-02-24/detail-ifztvsqr0577913.shtml
[22] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/work-02272020160853.html
[23] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/quarantine-02062020170637.html
[24] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/secret-02032020163623.html
[25] https://harvardilj.org/2020/04/the-international-health-regulations-the-past-and-the-present-but-what-future/
[26] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslims-labor.html
[27] Ibid.
[28] https://www.soas.ac.uk/blogs/study/surveillance-repression-and-re-education-in-chinas-xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region/
[29] https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/work-02272020160853.html
[30] http://v.ts.cn/system/2020/02/23/036110950.shtml
[31] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/world/asia/china-coronavirus-xinjiang.html
[32] https://www.axios.com/chinese-coronavirus-test-maker-agreed-to-build-a-xinjiang-gene-bank-f82b6918-d6c5-45f9-90b8-dad3341d6a6e.html
[33] Ibid.
[34] https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/US-China%20Biotech%20Report.pdf
[35] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/joint-statement-on-xinjiang
[36] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-mass-detentions-uighur-muslims-un-letter-human-rights-a9003281.html
[37] https://www.france24.com/en/20191127-china-communist-uighurs-xinjiang-muslim-silence-camps-repression
[38] Ibid.
[39] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/03/28/asia/imran-khan-china-uyghur-intl/index.html
[40] https://www.france24.com/en/20191127-china-communist-uighurs-xinjiang-muslim-silence-camps-repression
[41] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-uighur-muslims-concentration-camps-xi-china-john-bolton-book-a9571921.html
[42] https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-xinjiang/trump-says-he-held-off-xinjiang-sanctions-due-to-trade-talks-axios-interview-idUKKBN23T009
[43] https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/05/prakhar-raghuvanshi-uighur-muslims-covid19/
[44] https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-china-xinjiang/trump-signs-bill-pressuring-china-over-uighur-muslim-crackdown-idUKKBN23O3EF
[45] https://thehill.com/policy/international/503245-trump-signs-bill-to-sanction-chinese-officials-over-uighur-rights
Image credit: Barnaby Heddington in Kashgar, Xinjiang, China
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