Hanif Osman discusses the pace and scope of reform in the country recently named as The Economist’s Country of the Year 2019.
The most populous state of Central Asia has received considerable positive attention in recent months for its economic and political reforms. Uzbekistan was named The Economist magazine’s 2019 Country of the Year, due to new president Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s reforms since coming to power after the death of former leader Islam Karimov in December 2016.[1] These have included working to end the country’s notorious forced labour base in the cotton farming industry, the liberalisation of the largely state-controlled economy, and a more constructive foreign policy.
Indeed, when I travelled in Uzbekistan earlier this year, I encountered an outward-facing country with a vibrant and expanding economy. Visa rules for tourists were very recently relaxed, and the opening of more border posts with neighbouring states facilitated the relatively easy movement of foreigners and locals alike. This was an especially important change for the densely-populated Ferghana Valley, where jagged international borders and enclaves cut through the land, severing family and economic connections.
However, the current state and trajectory of human rights in Uzbekistan have been far less remarked upon. On the face of it, the country is ‘not free’ according to the latest Freedom in the World report.[2] Criticism of Uzbekistan’s human rights record stems from the country’s authoritarian political system, the restrictions to free speech and the right to protest, the commonplace jailing of political opponents, and torture used in detention facilities. The killing of hundreds of peaceful protestors in Andijan in May 2005 is perhaps the clearest symbol of the government’s repressive nature.[3]
Yet when the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was granted access to Uzbekistan for the first time in May 2017, he concluded that the new government showed clear intent to reform.[4] This article tracks the positive human rights developments in Uzbekistan in recent years. However, it also identifies many areas of remaining concern, some of which appear so significant as to overall cast a doubt on the prospects for democratisation and a dismantling of the authoritarian regime.
Political opposition and press freedom
Since 2017 around 50 high-profile political prisoners have been released, including human rights activists such as Akzam Turgunov and Fakhriddin Tillayev.[5] Notably, the final two journalists that had been in prison were released in May 2018, which suggests a shift in the government’s attitude to criticism. However, there remains an effective ban on establishing human rights organisations. Furthermore, thousands of political opponents are still imprisoned in Uzbekistan, including scholars, film producers and clerics.[6]
The recent election on 22 December 2019 utilised new methods in the administration of the ballot such as a central voter register and an intensive voter information campaign, though also other methods pertaining to “fundamental freedoms” were ignored.[7] This is because as with the previous election under Mirziyoyev in 2016, it was devoid of real political opposition – the four registered parties declared their support for the president before the vote was even concluded. [8] In fact, these parties are “effectively pro-government” according to Freedom House.[9] Genuine opposition parties, such as the Erk Democratic Party and its exiled leader Muhammad Solih, remain banned.[10]
However, the December election did attract more engagement from ordinary Uzbekistanis. Debates between party candidates were televised, and UN and OSCE monitors could observe the electoral process. Sherzodkhan Kudratkhojaev of the Central Elections Committee reported to Al Jazeera that “there’s a wide spectrum of issues being discussed, and the political parties have finally started to polemise with one another.”[11] Meanwhile, Akhmed Rahmanov, a research fellow at IPSE (Institut Prospective & Sécurité en Europe), offered a more pessimistic view, commenting that “people… realise that this election is not going to change much. There is no real opposition, no real competition and the Parliament doesn’t have much power”.[12] This comment symbolises the concern about the recent positive developments in Uzbekistan: the new president wishes to create the impression of greater political participation, whilst not actually achieving it.
In terms of press freedom, the government still maintains a firm grip of control on the sources of media available to citizens, and the internet is censored. One example is the Facebook group ‘Qorqmaymiz’, a group which numbers some 14,000 members and which, due to its criticism of the government, is illegal.[13] Other publications which are critical of the authorities remain blocked, and the rest of the media performs its own self-censorship. Government officials respond harshly to critical reporting, by arresting the authors of such material on false charges. For instance, in 2017 Nurullo Otakhonov, the author of a critical book of formerpresident Islam Karimov, was arrested on terrorism charges. Despite being released, he remained under investigation for other ‘constitutional’ offences.[14]
Torture and detention
In January 2018 the head of Uzbekistan’s National Security Service (SNB) was dismissed, and later that year five of the most senior members of the SNB were sentenced to prison for torture charges. Then, the law was changed so that the police and security services could restrain a person for a maximum of 48 hours, reduced from 72 hours previously. Finally, in November 2018 President Mirziyoyev issued a decree which prohibited the use of torture in gaining confessions and their admission as evidence in court.[15]
However, in December 2019 Human Rights Watch reported that “widespread, routine torture and ill-treatment” remain.[16] According to Hugh Williamson, Europe and Central Asia director at HRW, “the key pillars of the country’s abusive, authoritarian system are still in place”.[17] Since Mirzyoyev’s ascent to power in 2016, brutal torture methods have continually been reported. Indeed, reports to the Prosecutor’s office increased tenfold from 2017 to 2018, according to the United Nations Committee Against Torture.[18] Overall, the SNB remains incredibly powerful.
The use of forced labour in cotton fields continues during harvest periods, despite top-level government rhetoric to condemn it. It is local governmental authorities that apply pressure to civil servants, including medical professionals, teachers and students, to work in the fields. Amnesty International reported that monitoring of this work in the cotton fields is by human rights activists often prevented by police, using intimidation and arbitrary detention.[19] For example, in March 2018, police detained human rights defender Elena Urlaeva for one month to prevent her from speaking to the International Labour Organisation in Tashkent about the topic.[20]
Indeed, the government has failed to take adequate steps to end the practice, such as appointing an independent committee to monitor the situation across the country. It is additionally unclear whether any genuine condemnation of those local authorities’ actions in promoting forced labour has arisen from the central government; though on the facts, it appears unlikely.
Equality
In time for the December 2019 election, a new electoral code was passed – which included the provision that 30% of party candidates must be women, and lifted restrictions on those with criminal proceedings or convictions.[21] Homosexuality remains a criminal act in Uzbekistan, and transgender and homosexual people are subject to persecution.[22]
Positively, some gender-related legislation has been passed under the leadership of the new president. In April a draft law was publishing aiming to prevent sex discrimination by protecting women’s rights and setting penalties for breaching them. Two months before, President Mirziyoyev signed a decree purporting to increase women’s participating in state affairs.[23]
However, Uzbekistan remains one of the few countries in the world lacking any domestic violence legislation. In 2018, draft legislation on preventing domestic violence was published, though it has not progressed further.[24] Nonetheless, recently the Women’s Committee of Uzbekistan has established a hotline and several shelters for sufferers of violence.[25] In summary, there is clearly a vast amount of work required to improve the rights of women and minorities in Uzbekistan, but the direction of travel is positive.
Judicial Reform
In February 2018 the government announced it was committed to reforming the judiciary, including ensuring its independence as an institution, protecting citizens’ rights, and increasing its authority. Despite this, Freedom House reports that the judiciary remains dependent upon the executive government’s support, and corruption appears to be widespread.[26]
Positively, Mr Diego Garcia Sayán, UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, reported after his September 2019 visit to the country that “An increase in the number of acquittals in criminal proceedings demonstrates a gradual move from a system in which the autonomy of judges was limited to rubber-stamping decisions by the prosecutor”.[27] Indeed, from a total of just six acquittals recorded in 2016, by 2018 the figure stood at 867 acquittals.[28]
However Mr Sayán concluded that “substantial threats against judicial independence and the rule of law remain”.[29] These include defence lawyers struggling to access their clients, being the victim of threats, a severe lack of access to legal advice in the first place, and a limited separation of powers between the executive and judiciary.[30] Improvements such as better training of judges, establishing a Supreme Judicial Council as a constitutional body to insulate the judiciary from political pressure, and publishing court decisions on the Supreme Court’s website have gone some way to improving the judicial system, but significant issues clearly remain.[31]
Conclusion
Overall Uzbekistan’s human rights record has improved in recent years, though there remain significant issues. The release of high-profile government opponents, the reduction in cases of brutal torture, and the new leadership’s rhetoric about legislative and judicial changes certainly point in the right direction. The slight opening up of political debate and reduced fear of journalists being imprisoned also marks a positive development.
However, Uzbekistan retains many elements of its formerly authoritarian system. The lack of a genuinely competitive political system, which would present a real public challenge to the leader’s power, was evident in the most recent election at the end of 2019. Civil society remains weak without the legal ability of groups to protest and document government abuses of power. Furthermore, law enforcement authorities remain all-powerful, and torture is reputed to still be “widespread”, according to Human Rights Watch.[32] The judiciary is not independent, censorship of the media remains, and forced labour is still a fact of life in some of Uzbekistan’s cotton-producing regions.
Uzbekistan will continue to open to the world, but without continuous improvement to its human rights record, the extent of its development is brought into question. In the coming years, the interplay in Uzbekistan between human rights on the one hand, and economic development on the other, will be closely followed. A key question remains of this opaque regime: does President Mirziyoyev desire to create genuine political engagement, or more just the acquiescence of the population? Many commentators fear the latter. If the government were to continue its positive trajectory towards improving its human rights record and if – although it appears doubtful – genuine political participation is desired and indeed fostered by the Mirziyoyev government, then Uzbekistan’s already positive path towards success would be secured.
[1] https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/12/21/which-nation-improved-the-most-in-2019
[2] https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/uzbekistan
[3] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4550845.stm
[4] https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/13/uzbekistan-un-official-calls-rights-reforms
[5] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-50835845
[6] https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/uzbekistan
[7] https://www.economist.com/asia/2019/12/18/uzbekistan-holds-a-semi-serious-election
[8] https://www.dw.com/en/uzbekistan-set-to-confirm-new-parliament-loyal-to-reformist-president-shavkat-mirziyoyev/a-51769993
[9] https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2019/uzbekistan
[10] https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-50835845
[11] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/uzbekistan-set-hold-parliamentary-elections-lacking-opposition-191221085111732.html
[12] Ibid.
[13] https://webcertain.com/site/knowhowAmp/Internet-Censorship-In-Uzbekistan/kb1206
[14] https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b3cc25f26.html
[15] https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/uzbekistan/report-uzbekistan/
[16] https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/09/uzbekistan-torture-widespread-routine
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/uzbekistan/report-uzbekistan/
[20] Ibid.
[21] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/uzbekistan-set-hold-parliamentary-elections-lacking-opposition-191221085111732.html
[22] https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/uzbekistan/report-uzbekistan/
[23] https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/uzbekistan-gender-ineaulity-violence-en/
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b3cc25f26.html
[27] https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25043&LangID=E
[28] Ibid.
[29] https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25056&LangID=E
[30] https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25043&LangID=E
[31] Ibid.
[32] https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/09/uzbekistan-torture-widespread-routine
Image Credit: Ulugh Beg Madrasa, Samarkand, by Hanif Osman
Disclaimer: The BPP Human Rights blog, and all pieces posted on the blog, are written and edited exclusively by the student body. No publication or opinion contained within is representative of the values or beliefs held by BPP University or the Apollo Education Group. The views expressed are solely that of the author and are in no way supported or endorsed by BPP University, The Apollo Education Group or any members of staff.